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ABSTRACT
This article 1 starts by critiquing two recent attempts to
sociologically account for court delays in Mediterranean societies.

∗ Senior Lecturer in Law & Anthropology, Head of Department of Civil
Law, University of Malta, Malta; Executive Editor, Mediterranean Journal of
Human Rights; LL.D., University of Malta; Ph.D. in Legal Anthropology,
University of Durham. His central research interest is the ethnographic study of
legal processes.
1. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the European University
Institute’s 10th Mediterranean Research meeting held in Montecatini Terme
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The first account was produced by the sociologist David Nelken
and uses the concept of legal culture to explore the causes of court
delays in Italian criminal trials, while the second account was
produced by the anthropologist Michael Herzfeld, who sees court
delays in Crete as metonymically encapsulating a broader cultural
context. It is argued that both accounts omit an important
dimension of the issue, which is how such delays are produced and
justified at the level of legal practice itself. By referring to the
author’s fieldwork in the Maltese civil courts it is argued that court
delays are best explained with reference to the social relations
involved in legal practice, particularly those between lawyers and
clients. Delays must be related to the ways in which lawyers see
their role in litigation and these professional understandings are in
turn connected to the kinds of expectations that their clients have
of them.
In this article particular attention will be paid to discursive
invocations of these professional understandings by Maltese
lawyers in the mid-1990’s, while resisting administrative reforms
intended to streamline the procedures through which evidence is
compiled in court. Delays were justified as necessary
consequences of the lawyer’s professional role as locally
understood. This is possible as, although often considered as
synonymous with corruption, delay as a professional strategy is
capable of signalling an extraordinary range of meanings. In
particular, delay makes it possible for lawyers both to affirm and to
traverse the distance between everyday and legal concepts of
evidence, truth and reality. Delay is an intrinsic part of the
practical symbolism through which the specificity of “the legal” is
enacted. Through delay Maltese lawyers cope with the specific
demands of their clients by performing specific professional
understandings of legal representation as a matter of balancing
between patronage and professional detachment. The generative
matrix of these professional understandings can itself be located in
the colonial encounters which shaped Maltese legal history and its
mixed jurisdiction.

(March 25-28, 2009). I am grateful to the participants of the workshops for their
helpful feedback and advice.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although it evokes orientalising scholarly tropes about
“weak states” in Southern Europe and “Mediterranean time,” the
issue of delays in Mediterranean court litigation appears as an
interesting target of ethnographic investigation. This is not only
because these delays feature so prominently within internal and
external discourses about corruption, the nature of the state and
(the lack of) efficient governance, but also because the study of
how they are created and justified in practice requires precisely the
sort of detailed examination of the practices of judges, advocates
and other court-room actors that is needed in order to overcome the
dichotomy between “law in the books” and “law in action.” 2
Recent research by the anthropologist Michael Herzfeld
and the sociologist David Nelken can serve to indicate why
researching court delays may produce a broad range of insights
into Mediterranean states and societies. Nelken 3 focuses on the
causes of court delays in Italian criminal trials. He seeks an
explanation in a range of factors drawn from both “internal legal
culture” (including the organizational structure of the courts and a
tendency to multiply procedural safeguards) and “external legal
culture” (including such factors as the general tempo of Italian
social life and the contested character of the state). By contrast,
Herzfeld 4 sees court delays in Crete as rooted in a broader cultural
context, where the accusatory rhetoric of clients and the attitudes
they bring to their dealings with state officials are matched by
various defensive responses on the part of the bureaucrats,
particularly delay. While these investigations consider court delays
as a sort of window capable of giving us glimpses into very diverse
aspects of Greek and Italian social and cultural organisation, they
can also be criticized for neglecting to examine an important
dimension of the phenomenon, which is that of legal practice itself.
2. This distinction originated in the work of Roscoe Pound’s distinction
and has now become the starting point of most research in the field of Law and
Society.
3. David Nelken, Using the Concept of Legal Culture, 29 AUSTRALIAN J.
OF LEG. PHIL. (2004), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/csls/lss/20 (Last
visited November 9, 2011).
4. MICHAEL HERZFELD, A PLACE IN HISTORY (Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1991).
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Asking how delays are experienced and justified at the level of
legal practice means adopting an ethnographic perspective which
focuses our attention less on generic features of culture and social
structure, or even of legal culture, 5 and more on the practical
choices which must be made by the parties involved, particularly
the lawyers, in the course of the actual litigation when these delays
materialise and must be somehow justified or accounted for.
Using the ethnography of legal practice as a prism through
which to explore court delays requires a microscopic focus on the
social relationships through which the work of legal representation
is carried out, particularly those between lawyers, clients and
judges, and it also requires us to remember that each of the parties
involved is a “theorising agent” 6 in his/her own right. As court
litigation is largely controlled by legal professionals, such as
lawyers and judges, their theories concerning appropriate
professional practice must be interrogated in order to discover how
court delays can coexist with a professional self-image. Framing
the inquiry in this way follows the trend in the sociology of the
professions to view professionalism as primarily an “emic” or folkconcept and investigate it as such. 7 It has the added advantage that
it avoids making unwarranted and ethnocentric assumptions that
the content of professional ideals is the same in all European legal
systems, that the pursuit of these ideals necessarily leads lawyers
to promote the public interest, 8 or that delay is an inevitable result
of corruption and a failure of professionalism.
An ethnographic approach, which concentrates on the role
played by professional ideals in the daily practice of lawyers,
makes it possible to overcome what has been described as the:
5. That is, assuming that legal culture is conceived as a distinctive way of
structuring and organising the legal field. See, Nelken supra note 2.
6. MICHAEL HERZFELD, ANTHROPOLOGY THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS,
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989).
7. See, Pierre Bourdieu, Thinking about Limits, in CULTURAL THEORY
AND CULTURAL CHANGE 42 (Mike Featherstone ed., Sage, London, 1992);
TERRENCE JOHNSON, PROFESSIONS AND POWER (Macmillan, London, 1972);
Sarah Cant & Ursula Sharma, Reflexivity, ethnography and the professions
(complementary medicine). Watching you watching me watching you (and
writing about both of us), EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE SOC. REV. 246 (Oxford,
Blackwell Publishers 1998).
8. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS, (Oxford University Press,
New York & Oxford, 1989).
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“arbitrary separation between the sociology of law and the
sociology of the legal profession.” 9 Such an approach makes
visible the complex inter-relationships between professional ideals
and the specific social and cultural contexts in which they are
implemented. At the same time a purely ethnographic, “presenttense” approach itself needs to be embedded within the broader
social and historical framework provided by social anthropology.
II. FIELDWORK IN MALTA
This paper will draw on my anthropological fieldwork,
carried out in the Mediterranean island-state of Malta, to examine
the ways in which Maltese lawyers interpret and invoke
professional ideals in the course of their legal practice and when
confronting recent administrative reforms to the court procedures
for compiling evidence. These themes will here be approached
from the standpoint of my fieldwork on legal practice in Malta.
Initial fieldwork was carried out for a total of twenty-two months
between April 1996 and May 1997, followed by shorter periods of
field research in 2002 and 2006. 10 It was based on participant
observation in the offices of four Maltese lawyers 11 and in the civil
courts. I had access to these offices because I have a law degree,
having trained in law before studying anthropology. My research
concentrated on the ways in which lawyers and clients negotiate
the “facts” of the case, the production of evidence during court
litigation and its assessment during adjudication. The aim was to
acquire a holistic understanding of Maltese legal representation in
civil litigation by exploring the social relations through which it is
carried out. Through focusing on legal practice, I tried to build on
my own legal background so as to carry out a more reflexive and
practice-orientated ethnography, of the sort that sociologist Pierre

9. Ruth Buchanan, Constructing Virtual Justice in the Global Arena, 31:2
L. & SOC. REV. 364 (1997).
10. I am grateful to the Universities of Malta and Durham for funding my
research. This was made possible through a staff scholarship by the University
of Malta and an ORS grant on the part of the University of Durham.
11. According to my calculations, there were during the period of my
research close to three hundred lawyers involved in court litigation.
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Bourdieu has recommended. 12 In 2010, I expanded the scope of
my research to explore the historical development of court delays
in Malta by means, primarily of documentary research.
III. SCOPE OF THIS INVESTIGATION
This paper will initially focus on the pressures clients place
on their lawyers in office interviews. Against this backdrop, the
way Maltese lawyers interpret and invoke professional ideals in
their legal practice will be explored. This will be followed by an
ethnographically informed case study of the reforms attempted by
the Maltese government in 1996 to court procedures for compiling
evidence, which will attempt to account for the failure of these
reforms and in the process highlight the defensive and largely
obstructive responses of legal professionals and the role played by
professional ideals in legitimating these responses. This article will
then explore how Maltese legal practice was described by
practitioners in 1912 and relate this to the trends which were
observed during my fieldwork. Finally, some more general
conclusions about the character of the Maltese legal system will be
attempted.
IV. LAWYER/CLIENT INTERVIEWS
Office interviews with lawyers, in which clients
communicate the facts and receive legal advice and guidance, are
an indispensable starting point to explore the social uses of
professional ideologies. These interviews are central to
lawyer/client interaction as during their discussion of the case both
parties will also informally negotiate their relationship. During my
fieldwork, story-telling was the most prominent feature of the
interviews I observed. While my training in law had led me to
expect clients to state “facts” structured according to legal
categories, what I experienced was a more confused and contested
process. Rural and working class clients in particular would
smuggle stories stressing their own morally upright behaviour
12. PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE (Polity Press, Cambridge,
1997).
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within their narrative accounts of the facts. Such stories were told
despite the inattention of lawyers and even though they seemed
legally irrelevant. In one case, for instance, a small rural
businessman seeking his lawyers’ help in some financial
transactions, explained that he had always “walked straight,” (i.e.,
acted honourably) and that while he was prepared to give away
free gifts, he could not tolerate being robbed by others. Similarly, a
working-class widow who was trying to repatriate her husband’s
money kept insisting with her lawyer that she did not want this
money for herself, but so as to leave it to her children equally in
the event of her death. The persistence of clients in recounting
these personalised stories seemed even more paradoxical since
lawyers told me that their only aim was to get the facts straight and
disclaimed any interest in the moral qualities of their clients: “who
should only be judged once.”
Certain features of clients’ stories throw light on their
significance. These narratives create moral sympathy for clients
because they inject powerful cultural values into descriptions of
past actions. This can be illustrated by the story of the rural
businessman earlier mentioned. He talked about “walking
straight”, because in Maltese “walking” is used metaphorically to
morally evaluate the way in which a person relates to others. A
person who “walks straight” is one who avoids corrupting social
obligations which
deviate one’s life-walk, impeding
straightforward adherence to moral ideals. Consequently the
businessman endowed himself with an honourable autonomy,
which could be used to exert pressure on his lawyer, 13 authorising
him to express powerful emotions and thump on his desk in anger
at being robbed. Through these stories, moreover, clients also try
to translate their moral virtue into legal entitlement in their
lawyers’ eyes. This is made explicit in the businessman’s case,
since the expression: nimxi dritt, or “I walk straight” plays on the
way dritt in Maltese not only means straightness, but also a legal
right, or even the undifferentiated whole of legal and moral rules.

13. Analogously, by stressing her impartial concern for her children, the
widow sought to portray herself as a good wife and mother as the role was
traditionally conceived in Malta.
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This analysis indicates that clients’ narratives are best
understood not solely as ways of communicating the facts, but also
as attempts to control their relationships with their lawyers. They
operate as what linguist Deborah Tannen 14 has called:
“involvement strategies,” since they are a medium through which
clients can involve lawyers in personal relationships based on
shared moral values, obliging them to actively “advocate” their
interests. Anthropologists have observed such patronage
relationships in Malta 15 and elsewhere in the Mediterranean
region. 16 Their ideological structure has been aptly described as:
“the moral englobing of political asymmetry that allows the client
to maintain self-respect while gaining material advantage.” 17
Clients use various strategies to try to create these patronage
relationships. 18
These efforts to create patronage derive from complex
social causes, which can only be briefly indicated here. Some seem
to be common to other Mediterranean societies. Thus, Herzfeld 19
has related the need for mechanisms of social incorporation in
Greek society to the absence of a fully integrated capitalist
economy, the competitive and hostile character of extra-familial
social relations and the weakness and relative youth of the nationstate. 20 Other causes relate more specifically to Malta, such as the
14. DEBORAH TANNEN, TALKING VOICES: REPETITION, DIALOGUE AND
IMAGERY IN CONVERSATIONAL DISCOURSE (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1989).
15. JEREMY BOISSEVAIN, SAINTS AND FIREWORKS: RELIGION AND POLITICS
IN RURAL MALTA (Progress Press Co. Ltd, Valletta, Malta, 1993).
16. JOHN K CAMPBELL, HONOUR, FAMILY, AND PATRONAGE (Oxford
University Press, New York & Oxford, 1974).
17. Michael Herzfeld, ‘As In Your Own House:’ Hospitality, Ethnography
and the Stereotype of Mediterranean Society, in HONOUR AND SHAME AND THE
UNITY OF THE MEDITERRANEAN 86 (Gilmore ed., Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1987).
18. For instance, I often observed Maltese clients give gifts to their lawyers
and trying to involve them in discussions about non-legal matters. Gifts ranged
from the proverbial bottle of whisky in Christmas to providing free access to a
beach resort owned by the client.
19. MICHAEL HERZFELD, THE SOCIAL PRODUCTION OF INDIFFERENCE:
EXPLORING THE SYMBOLIC ROOTS OF WESTERN BUREAUCRACY (Chicago
University Press, Chicago, 1993).
20. Herzfeld explains that consequently the Greek nation-state has not
absorbed into itself all the idioms of social identity; so that these can function
independently of and be employed to contest the state structure. Id.
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historically derived sense of alienation of the Maltese from a state
apparatus belonging to a foreign colonial power 21 or the modelling
of political power on Catholic religion with its stress on saintly
mediators between person and God. 22 In a small-scale society
impersonality can become a scarce (and valued) commodity. As
one Maltese proverb has it: “Malta is small and people are
known.” 23
Popular perceptions of lawyers and the court system may
also motivate clients to try to create patronage relationships.
Rampant delays in litigation have given a bad name to the Maltese
courts and clients may seek their lawyers’ patronage to ensure that
their cases are handled efficiently. The ambiguous social role of
lawyers as mediators between their clients and the state legal
system may make it difficult to discover whose side the lawyer is
on. If middle-class clients complained about the links between
lawyers and criminals, those coming from a rural or working-class
background saw lawyers as part of a dominating and exploitative
upper class. Significantly, it is the clients who were the most
socially distant from the urban professional classes who often
seemed to be trying hardest to involve their lawyers in patronage
relationships.
It seems clear, therefore, that Maltese lawyers often come
under intense pressure from clients, especially those coming from a
rural or lower-class background, who try to create personal
relationships with them in order to control the way they carry out
their work. Clients make indirect attempts to develop these
patronage ties, evoking moral sympathy through the way they
narrate the “facts” of the case. This strategy is difficult to rebuff,
given the “inescapably moral” 24 quality of the stories through
which the “facts” are communicated.

21. EDWARD L. ZAMMIT, A COLONIAL INHERITANCE: MALTESE
PERCEPTIONS OF WORK, POWER AND CLASS STRUCTURE WITH REFERENCE TO
THE LABOUR MOVEMENT (Malta University Press, Malta, 1984).
22. BOISSEVAIN, supra note 14.
23. In Maltese this reads: “Malta zghira u n-nies maghrufa.”
24. JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 50 (Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1990).
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V. THE SOCIAL USES OF PROFESSIONAL IDEALS
Lawyers’ professional ideals have here been approached
from the standpoint of their interviews with clients. This is because
these ideals are not simply abstract principles to which lawyers pay
lip-service. On the contrary, they have a direct practical
application, helping to equip lawyers to cope with the pressures
clients place on them. These social uses of professional ideals are
revealed by the way they are taught to new generations of lawyers.
Until recently professional ethics were not fully incorporated into
the standard academic curriculum of the University of Malta. They
are still mostly transmitted to young lawyers by practitioners
during the liminal period of transition from the University to legal
practice. 25 Moreover a Maltese code of professional ethics for
lawyers was only published in 1996. 26 Thus the transmission of
professional ideology is still largely seen as part of a process of
oral socialisation through which young lawyers learn to view
themselves as members of a professional community with its own
distinct interests.
An important practical use of professional ideals is that of
justifying lawyers’ non-response to their clients’ stories. During
my fieldwork, I often observed lawyers keeping a sceptical
distance based on the need to preserve their professional
detachment. This refusal to fully endorse clients’ narratives was
signalled by the ironical comments lawyers sometimes made, the
contextual absurdity of which showed they were not taken in. 27 A
sense of professional detachment could also be transmitted through
25. Generally professional ethics are taught in the final year of the LL.D.
course, which was until very recently perceived as a period when the academic
teaching of law was at an end, so that students concentrate on their
apprenticeship and on preparing their theses. Professional ethics are also
favourite subjects for speeches on such occasions as the granting of the
professional warrant, or in seminars organised by the law students’ society.
26. Reference is made to the Code of Ethics and Conduct for Advocates,
published in 1996 by the Commission for the Administration of Justice, The
Palace, Valletta, Malta.
27. For instance, in one case, a landlord kept telling his lawyer what a
gentlemanly relationship he enjoyed with his tenants, while he also sought
advice on how he could legally increase the rent. His lawyer calmly observed
that as the tenants were professional people, it was going to be difficult for the
landlord to make fools of them!
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formal clothing, the organisation of space in legal offices 28 and an
aloof attitude when interacting with clients. These invocations of
professional ideals clearly reflect attempts by lawyers to resist
entanglement in patron/client relationships.
The connection between the professional ideals upheld by
Maltese lawyers and their clients’ involvement strategies can be
perceived by exploring the way the task of legal representation is
described according to professional ideology. The comments of
one established and highly respected lawyer are typical in this
regard. When interviewed on this point, this lawyer made a
distinction between the “case,” which the lawyer is duty bound to
present to the court as effectively as possible, and “facts,” which
are “in the hands of the client” to prove. 29 He observed that the
stories clients tell under oath and in the courtroom context are
often very different from the ones they originally told their
lawyers. Consequently facts should emerge in the courtroom
setting of an oral hearing, which he termed a “search for truth”
undertaken before the judge. He therefore objected to the use of
written affidavits 30 as an alternative way of collecting evidence;
claiming that they tempted lawyers to write their clients’ stories for
them and risk perjuring themselves. He also observed that he had
never witnessed a signature in the absence of the person
concerned.
Thus, professional ideals portray legal representation as a
process where the lawyer’s concern with the issues at stake is
distinguished from that of her client. Lawyers are concerned solely
with the “case,” consisting of the legal arguments and claims to be
made. 31 It is the client’s primary responsibility to prove the “facts,”
on the basis of which these legal arguments are raised. This
distinction establishes a conceptual boundary between the domain
28. Professional detachment was conveyed by maintaining a spatial
demarcation between the ‘front office,’ where clients wait and their files are
located and the ‘inner office,’ where lawyers sit surrounded by law-books.
29. In Maltese this reads: “Il-fatti f’idejn il-kljent.”
30. An affidavit is a written statement of the client’s version of the facts.
They are supposed to be precise reproductions of their stories and clients must
confirm them on oath. Maltese judges are increasingly requesting the
presentation of affidavits instead of oral testimony.
31. Lawyers are prepared to accept more involvement with the facts in
criminal cases.
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of the client, which is one of potentially changeable oral stories of
dubious credibility, and the domain of the lawyer, which is one of
legally valid writing. By drawing such a boundary, lawyers escape
responsibility for proving their clients’ stories, confining their role
to legal argumentation. In fact, Maltese lawyers constantly assert
their detachment through expressions like: “trying to win the case
for the client,” which imply they have no personal interest in the
outcome. 32
This professional model of legal representation is
significant for two principal reasons. Firstly, it is almost
diametrically opposed to the way most clients would like to
construct their working relationships with lawyers. Whereas clients
would like to start from a moral consensus with their lawyers
concerning the facts of the case, the professional model requires
lawyers to base their court-room representation on a prima facie
assessment of the facts which is solely intended to clarify the legal
issues involved. Clients often believe that once they take on a case,
lawyers assume responsibility for ensuring a successful outcome in
the court-room. By contrast, the professional model places the
burden of producing convincing evidence firmly in the hands of
the client, restricting the lawyer’s role to “purely legal”
argumentation. 33 Consequently, although the client might feel that
this is unethical, the professional model authorises a lawyer to
institute a court case on behalf of an insistent client even if the
lawyer believes that he will lose the case because his evidence is
not sufficiently persuasive or credible. 34 Evidence belongs in the
clients’ hands and lawyers are distanced from any responsibility
for it.
Secondly and more importantly, it seems clear that
professional ideals which have the effect of distancing them from
32. Strictly speaking, lawyers have no financial interest in winning lawsuits. This is because their fees are calculated according to an official tariff,
according to such matters as the value of the object of the suit. Naturally,
however, lawyers who consistently lose suits will probably fail to attract as
many clients as others.
33. Thus, clients’ views on affidavits contrast to those of lawyers. In fact,
clients complained to me that their lawyers had barely glanced at the affidavits
they wrote. While clients expected their lawyers to take responsibility for the
evidence, this is precisely what the latter wanted to avoid.
34. Of course the lawyer has a recognised duty to inform his client that he
thinks he will lose the case.
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responsibility for the “facts” can be very useful to lawyers in a
social context where clients try to use their narration of the “facts”
to implicate them in patronage relationships. I suggest that Maltese
lawyers favour an extensive interpretation of the meaning of
professional detachment when representing clients in litigation
precisely because it allows them to escape the pressures which
clients exert through the medium of the “facts.” If this is correct,
then it shows how the interpretation of professional ideals is
influenced by the practical context in which it occurs.
This analysis is open to the objection that I have overemphasised the homogeneity of Maltese lawyers, ignoring the
occupational differentiation of the profession and possible
differences in style and approach which might lead to different
interpretations of professionalism. However, the internal
differentiation of the Maltese legal profession is not very great. My
statistics 35 show that when my ethnographic research commenced
in the mid 1990’s, 44% of lawyers were sole private practitioners,
28% were employed with law-firms and 13% with the
Government. The remainder was either non-practising or employed
with various private companies. Moreover, Maltese law-firms are
usually small partnerships where the type of work closely
resembles that of a sole practitioner. Indeed, only four of the lawfirms listed in 1994 had a membership of seven or more and the
largest of these grouped eleven lawyers. In the exercise of their
profession, most firm lawyers find that it is important to be flexible
and to be prepared to carry out different types of work, even if they
have specialised in certain fields. 36
Stylistic differences in handling clients exist and they do
seem to be broadly correlated to occupational status. Sole
practitioners are more likely to devote time to listening to their
clients and to provide some endorsement of their stories, while
firm lawyers tend to place a higher premium on efficient time
management. However most lawyers find it necessary to
35. Data was culled from the ‘Legal and Court Directory’ produced by the
Camera degli Avvocati, the Maltese lawyers’ association. The directory contains
a list of practising lawyers which can be considered as fairly exhaustive, given
that practically all practising lawyers are members. I consulted the 1994 and
1992 issues of this Directory.
36. This is due to the small size of Malta, which means that the number of
legal jobs available in any area of practice is necessarily limited.
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strategically balance between patronage and professionalism when
handling clients. The attractions of professionalism are obvious,
since it frees lawyers from clients’ pressures and allows greater
efficiency. Yet there are important reasons why even firm lawyers
find that they cannot avoid acting as if they were, to some extent,
their clients’ patrons. 37 Thus, as already observed, many clients
want to create patronage relationships and lawyers, who operate in
a very competitive market, are eager not to alienate them.
Moreover certain clients do not feel able to confide secrets to their
lawyers unless they have a personal relationship with them.38
Finally, as was previously argued, patronage relations are in a way
in-built into clients’ stories.
It follows that despite the existence of occupational and
stylistic differences among Maltese lawyers, they generally attempt
to strike a balance by providing limited endorsement of their
clients’ narratives while also trying to emphasise their professional
detachment from them. Few lawyers are willing to forego the
benefits of belonging to the “Professjoni Libera,” or “free
profession” as they call it, by wholeheartedly identifying
themselves with their clients in patronage relationships. Indeed,
one such case reported to me is highly instructive. The lawyer
concerned is criticised by some of his colleagues both because he
develops close patronage relations with his clients and because he
drafts long, verbose, affidavits on their behalf. This criticism
clearly shows how lawyers equate professional detachment, in the
sense of keeping the necessary distance from the client, with
professional legal representation, in the sense of confining oneself
to the legal issues and leaving ultimate responsibility for the
“facts” to the client. 39 Clearly, most Maltese lawyers believe their
37. By, for instance, occasionally waiving payment for legal advice and
giving more attention to clients.
38. JULIETTE DU BOULAY, PORTRAIT OF A GREEK MOUNTAIN VILLAGE
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1974).
39. A similar model of legal representation is found in the Maltese code of
ethics for lawyers (op. cit.). Significantly, this code prescribes that an advocate
representing clients in civil litigation: “is under a duty to say on behalf of the
client what the client should properly say for himself or herself if the client were
allowed to plead for himself or herself and possessed the requisite skill,
knowledge and legal training” (Rule 11, Part IV, Cap 1). By requiring advocates
to restrict their representation to what clients should “properly” say, this code
prevents their complete identification with clients.
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professional detachment requires them to performatively avoid
excessive involvement with the “facts,” viewed as a potential
source of “symbolic pollution,” in Mary Douglas’ terms. 40
VI. THE PROCEDURAL REFORMS OF 1996
Having explored the way lawyers interpret professional
ideals in the ordinary course of their legal practice, it is now
possible to reach a deeper understanding of the obstacles impeding
certain reforms which the Maltese Government carried out in 1996
to the system by which evidence is compiled in court. By focusing
on this particular case-study, the broader social effects of
professional ideals will be highlighted. Firstly, however, it is
necessary to explain the pre-1996 system for compilation of
evidence and the public discontent which motivated these reforms
in the first place.
Litigation before the Maltese civil courts occurs in two
successive phases. A preliminary written phase, in which the
litigants send each other their respective written legal claims and
statements of defence, is followed by an oral phase when the
parties and their witnesses testify and the lawyers question
witnesses and present their own arguments. During the written
phase and together with their legal claims, the litigants are obliged
to send each other a “declaration of facts” which should contain
their respective statements of the “facts” at stake. Together with
this, each of the litigants is also expected to file a list of the
documents and a list of the witnesses which s/he intends to
produce during the case. After the preliminary exchange of their
written claims, the case then shifts to the oral stage where each of
the litigants has a chance to testify and to produce any witnesses
mentioned in her list. Testimony is usually heard in a certain order:
starting from the plaintiff and continuing with his witnesses and
followed by the defendant and his witnesses. Witnesses are first
examined by the lawyer for the party who summoned them and
then cross-examined by the opposing lawyer. Their replies are
40. MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
CONCEPTS OF POLLUTION AND TABOO (Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, London,
1988).
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transcribed by the court clerk. Often, important documents are
handed over to the court by witnesses in the course of testimony.
After all the witnesses have been examined, the .judge defers the
case so that he can pronounce his judgement.
What this account omits are all the delays which are caused
when this system is implemented in practice. These are due to
various causes. For instance, litigants often find it impossible to
summon all their witnesses to testify on the same day.
Consequently, cases are usually postponed for three months so as
to hear the testimony of new witnesses. Some litigants tend to
name fifty or sixty witnesses and expect to be allowed to summon
them all to testify! Additional problems are caused when particular
witnesses do not come to court or cannot be traced and the case is
normally put off to allow lawyers to try to contact these witnesses.
There are many other causes of delay which cannot be mentioned
here. It is important, however, to note that delays mostly arise
during the oral phase of litigation, when testimony is being
produced. Court delays had multiplied during the late 1990’s and
remain a persistent cause for concern today. 41 Thus, statistics given
by the Minister of Justice for 1997 42 indicate that by the end of
January 1997, there were a total of 22,861 cases pending before all
the Maltese courts, many of which were pending before the civil
courts. 43 By comparison, government statistics 44 indicate that at
the end of March 2011, there were a total of 23,133 pending cases
before all the Maltese courts. 45
41. See the report on the recent visit conducted in Malta by the Council of
Europe’s Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, Court Backlog under
Scrutiny, TIMES OF MALTA, Nov. 24, 2011 (Malta, Allied Newspapers Ltd.).
42. These figures were given by Justice Minister Charles Mangion in a
reply to a Parliamentary Question. They were reproduced in The Times of Malta
on March 5, 1997.
43. Of these, 1067 cases were pending before the Court of Appeal; 8318
before the Civil Courts, and 11,150 before the Magistrates’ Courts.
44. Statistics for 2011 were culled from the reports published on the Malta
Ministry of Justice’s website. Ministry for Justice and Home Affairs, available
at http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/courtservices/Statistics/default.aspx (Last
visited November 11, 2011).
45. Of these, 1348 were pending before the Court of Appeal, 6450 before
the Civil Courts, 15,223 before the Magistrates’ Courts and there were 112
pending cases before the Criminal Court. In order to ensure comparability of this
data with the that given in 1997, I have added together the data for pending Civil
cases which was compiled on March 31, 2011 with the published data
concerning pending Criminal cases of March 2011. The figure for the total
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At the time increased media attention had begun to focus
on the issue of court delays, as is still the case today. It is
acknowledged as a serious problem which results in the denial of
justice and alienates people from the courts. 46 Partly in reaction to
this growing public concern and in order to enhance the efficiency
of the courts, the Maltese government in July 1996 enacted a law
to reform various procedural rules. 47 This law contained provisions
relating to the trial of law-suits which caused controversy. In
particular attention focused on the new procedure to be followed
by judges when compiling evidence in civil trials.
In terms of this new procedure, a pre-trial hearing was to be
held before the first sitting in the case. The aim of this hearing in
the words of the government minister, himself a lawyer, who
introduced the amendments, was to allow the court to “identify and
record the points of law and fact in contention and the proof to be
given by each witness.” 48 The second major innovation was that
after the pre-trial hearing, judges were given the option of
choosing the system by which evidence was to be heard.

pending Appeal cases was reached by adding together the data concerning
pending cases before the Constitutional Court, the Criminal Court of Appeal and
the Civil Court of Appeal in both Gozo and Malta in its Superior and Inferior
sections. The figure for the total pending Civil cases comprises cases pending
before the Family court apart from those pending before the First Hall of the
Civil court. The figure for the total pending cases before the Magistrates’ Court
was reached by adding together all the pending Civil cases before the
Magistrates’ Court together with all the Criminal cases for both Gozo and Malta
and excluding the statistics for cases pending before the Small Claims tribunal,
which did not exist in 1997.
46. A good example of the tone of the comments made by the Maltese
newspapers is represented by two newspaper editorials which both appeared
during June 1997, while I was writing up my research. While the editorial of the
conservative daily The Times emphasized the need to speed up court
proceedings, that of the left-wing weekly It-Torca claimed “In the
administration of justice, the citizen expects the legal process to be efficient
(emphasis added), comprehensible and really just. The citizen is not satisfied on
any one of these points.”
47. The law in question is Act 24 of 1996, which amended the Code of
Organisation and Civil Procedure. The provisions of this law which concern us
were brought into effect by means of a legal notice in 1996.
48. J. M. Fenech, Procedural Law and the Courts, THE SUNDAY TIMES,
Dec. 29, 1996 (Malta, Allied Newspapers Ltd.). See also J. M. Fenech, Justice
within a Reasonable Time, THE SUNDAY TIMES, Dec. 1, 1996 (Malta, Allied
Newspapers Ltd.); J. M. Fenech, Wake Up Minister, THE SUNDAY TIMES, May
11, 1997 (Malta, Allied Newspapers Ltd.).
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Previously the principle was that all testimony had to be heard
orally. Instead judges were now given the option of compiling all
evidence by means of written affidavits prepared by parties and
their witnesses and deposited in court. 49 However, even if this
“affidavit system” were to be chosen, the opposing lawyer was to
continue to enjoy the facility of conducting an oral crossexamination of parties and witnesses on the testimony contained in
their affidavits. Finally, the third innovation was that judges were
then to fix a date for a full hearing of testimony (if the evidence
was to be compiled viva voce) or for hearing by cross-examination
(if the affidavits system was selected). During this sitting all the
oral testimony to be presented in the case was to be heard
uninterruptedly. There were to be no adjournments except in very
special circumstances. This contrasted with the previous system, in
which witnesses were heard on several different sittings and
adjournments were frequently granted.
Before exploring these innovations further, it is important
to consider the way they were implemented. The collective
response of judges to the amendments was to introduce a new
judicial role: that of the Master, which was not contemplated in the
amendments. 50 By agreement among the bench, one of the judges
assumed this role and was entrusted with around 3,000 cases in
which, to quote the current Chief Justice “very little was being
done.” 51 His task was to be that of conducting a pre-trial hearing in
this case and in all new cases to be filed in the future. After he had
clarified the points in issue and the proof to be made by different
witnesses, he was to transfer these files to the other judges before
whom the actual court sittings would be held. Consequently while
the amendments had contemplated that all judges would hold a
pre-trial hearing in every law-suit they adjudicated, the effect of
the judges’ decision was that only one of the judges would conduct
the pre-trial hearings. Moreover this judge would not be the one
before whom these cases were actually heard. The Chief Justice
justified these changes on the grounds that:
49. Previously, the use of affidavits tended to be restricted to the testimony
of the litigating parties themselves.
50. The master system was modelled on English procedures.
51. Joseph Said Pullicino, Chief Justice on effectiveness of amendments to
the C.O.C.P, THE SUNDAY TIMES, Jun. 1, 1997 (Malta, Allied Newspapers Ltd.).
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[I]n a situation like ours where the administrative
infrastructure is lacking, where the number of
judges was inadequate and the culture of accepting
certain systems of control on the compilation of
evidence and the regulation of the cause by the
judge objected to, all these amendments, rigidly
applied, could not have the desired beneficial effect
without bringing about a traumatic experience.
There was, on the contrary, the danger that this
would bring about a total collapse of the system
(emphasis added). It was principally for this reason,
therefore, that through an administrative process–
which was not contemplated in the amendments and
introduced clandestinely (emphasis added)–the
system of the Master was introduced. 52
In November 1996, there was a change of Government. On
meeting with the new Minister of Justice, the President of the
Chamber of Advocates called for the abolition of the affidavits
system, which was the second plank of the newly introduced
reforms. He claimed that this worked against the conscience and
professional training of lawyers. He hoped, however, that the
Master system “would be operated more effectively.” 53 Following
this, there was mounting criticism of the new Master system from
various lawyers and judges, on the grounds that it had only served
to create another bottle-neck, since one judge could not possibly
hold pre-trial hearings in 3,000 cases together with all the new lawsuits that were being filed.
The next development occurred in April 1997, when a
seminar was organised to discuss the implementation of the new
amendments. Opening this seminar, the Chief Justice admitted that
the Master system was not working as well as originally planned. 54
Then, in June 1997, the Minister of Justice announced the setting
up of an Advisory Committee for the Law-Courts. The committee
was given an extensive brief, which included continuous
52. Id.
53. R. Cremona, Chamber of Advocates meets new Justice Minister: Call
for abolition of affidavits system, THE SUNDAY TIMES, Nov. 7, 1996 (Malta,
Allied Newspapers Ltd.).
54. Pullicino, supra note 51.
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monitoring of the situation and recommending changes to the laws,
administrative set-up and the Master system in order to increase
the efficiency of the courts. While I was unable to discover
whether this committee still exists and what recommendations it
might have made, the failure of the 1996 reforms to alter
significantly the mode of trial in Malta was already clear by
January 1999 when the President of the Chamber of Advocates
delivered a speech in which he called on the legal profession to
give the new Master system a proper try, asking them: “not to
discard the system before attempting to employ it in its entirety.” 55
VII. PROFESSIONALLY DISTANCING LAW FROM FACT
My reason for recounting the history of these failed reforms
to trial procedures is to highlight the relationship all the
protagonists drew between court delays and the manner in which
evidence is compiled. They argued that there is a Maltese culture,
or “ingrained mentality,” which resists greater control on the
process of compilation of evidence. 56 This mentality is so powerful
that it induced judges to introduce the Master system, so as to
avoid “a traumatic change [which could] lead to the total collapse
of the system.” 57 Moreover, this mentality had even subverted the
Master system itself. However, in the light of the preceding
discussion of the way Maltese lawyers interpret their professional
role, the repeated failure of these reforms does not seem so
surprising. If Maltese lawyers believe that professionalism is
asserted through avoiding excessive involvement with the facts of
the case by leaving them in the hands of their clients to prove, then
they might not be too keen about reforms which operate precisely
by obliging lawyers to take more responsibility for the factual
aspect of cases.
Taking more responsibility for the facts is the common
thread which links the various reforms proposed in 1996 to the
system of compilation of evidence of the Maltese courts. This is
55. R. Cremona, Call on legal profession to give master system a proper
try, THE SUNDAY TIMES, Jan. 21, 1999 (Malta, Allied Newspapers Ltd.).
56. J. Brincat, The Alarm Clock, THE SUNDAY TIMES, May 18, 1997
(Malta, Allied Newspapers Ltd.).
57. Pullicino, supra note 51.
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most evident in the case of the proposed system for compiling
evidence through affidavits, which provoked lawyers’ protests that
it obliged them to act unprofessionally. However even the
proposed “pre-trial” and Master systems function by requiring the
parties to state the facts as they see them at the start of the case in a
less formal arena than that of ordinary litigation. In such a setting,
lawyers would not have had such a clearly defined role as they
have during a court-room trial and it would be more difficult for
them to assert their detachment from the factual aspect of the case.
Lawyers would be more personally involved in telling and
validating their clients’ stories.
In resisting these reforms, lawyers followed a well
established tradition. As part of an attempt at reforming the
Maltese courts, the British Royal Commission of 1913 had
recommended that a written “declaration of facts” be submitted by
litigating parties at the start of their lawsuit. While this requirement
was incorporated into the law, it was negatively perceived by the
lawyers, who scented a threat to their professional detachment.
Their collective reaction was to draft these “declarations of facts”
in such an elliptical way as to turn them into what are effectively
summaries of the statements of the legal claims being made in the
case; thus leaving the “facts” to emerge in the course of the oral
court-room hearing. 58
Analogously, lawyers expressed resistance to the 1996
procedural reforms in both direct and indirect ways. As the earlierquoted extract from the Chief Justice’s speech made clear, it was
actually judges rather than lawyers who aborted the system of pretrial hearings by “clandestinely” 59 introducing the Master system.
However, as the Chief Justice also noted, they were anticipating
the objections lawyers would make; given their objections to
“certain systems of control on the process of compilation of
evidence.” 60 All Maltese judges are drawn from the pool of
practising lawyers, together with whom they constitute a tightly58. So as to explore this issue, I examined the first fifty law-suits filed in
February 1997. There were only three instances in which the ‘declaration of
facts’ filed by the plaintiff was substantially different from the ‘citazzjoni’ (the
statement of the plaintiff’s legal claims), containing additional details which
were not mentioned in it.
59. Pullicino, supra note 51.
60. Id.
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knit court community. Maltese judges are keen to uphold their
independence in the face of possible government interference.
They are therefore disinclined to rigidly apply administrative
reforms which could antagonise lawyers, especially if these
reforms appear to raise problems of professional ethics. These
attitudes seem also to have contributed to widespread noncompliance with the rule that all evidence be produced in one court
sitting and to a notable lack of enthusiasm for the new option of
compiling most of the evidence by means of affidavits.
Through their resistance Maltese lawyers managed to
safeguard their understanding of their professional role in the face
of administrative reforms which threatened to define it differently.
While the logical implication of this analysis is that the causes of
court delays are rooted in the way these lawyers have understood
their professional role in litigation, it is important to avoid an
overly idealistic account of these professional understandings. By
leading lawyers to avoid taking responsibility for the “facts” and to
insist that these must be proved by clients in the courtroom, they
create room for various lawyerly tactics through which the process
of producing evidence is made more elaborate and time
consuming. These tactics depend for their success on the increased
time it takes to produce oral, as opposed to written, evidence in
court. Written affidavits also take less time to read and make it
easier to establish the points of contrast and similarity between the
versions of the different parties and their witnesses. Conversely, if
the “facts” are orally produced, then it becomes possible to:
1. Produce irrelevant testimony or contest all the
evidence presented by one’s opponent in litigation.
This is because the relevant “facts in issue” remain
unclear for a longer time.
2. Summon many witnesses to testify to the same
“facts.”
3. Conceal valuable evidence from the opposing
party in litigation, until it becomes strategically
appropriate to disclose it.
The outcome of these tactics can be described as the
“problematisation
of
evidence.”
By
referring
to
“problematisation,” I want to highlight how difficult and
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problematic the process of compilation of evidence can be made
and to suggest that such an outcome may often be actively
intended. After all, it can be in the interest of both lawyers and
their clients to create delays. In this way, lawyers can gain more
control over the evolution of litigated cases and acquire more space
to manoeuvre in the interests of their clients. Moreover, a client
who looks set to lose a case may benefit from such delays. It
seems, in brief, that professional interests may easily fuse with
professional ideals in a powerful combination which explains the
perseverance with which lawyers have resisted attempts to reform
the system by which evidence is compiled.
This analysis leads to the conclusion that there is a clear
connection between the specific way in which Maltese lawyers
interpret their professional role, pervasive court delays and the
failure of Government efforts to reform the administration of
justice. Other implications stem from a deeper consideration of the
tactics through which the production of evidence is
“problematised.” As I have shown, the leitmotif behind these
tactics is that they create obstacles to the effort to bring “law” and
“fact” into some sort of facile correspondence with each other,
although creating such a correspondence is the central function of
court litigation. By expressing professional ideals which separate
“law” from “fact” and lawyer from client, these tactics also
reinforce a particular way of imagining Maltese law, which
constructs the legal domain in separatist, exclusive and selfreferential terms. 61 The production of delay and inefficiency in
court proceedings hence becomes invested with symbolic meaning.
In particular, delay makes it possible for lawyers both to affirm and
to traverse the distance between everyday and legal concepts of
evidence, truth and reality. Delay is an intrinsic part of the
processes by which the specificity of “the legal” is affirmed in
practice. This inverts Nelken’s analysis, as delay appears as a tool
by which lawyers themselves construct, in their own way and for
their own purposes, the distinction between “internal” and
“external” legal culture.

61. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN
INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 184 (Basic Books, New York, 1983).
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VIII. DELAY AND THE “COLONIAL ENCOUNTER”
Through delay Maltese lawyers cope with the specific
demands of their clients by enacting specific professional
understandings of legal representation as a matter of distancing
“law” from “fact” by balancing between patronage and
professional detachment. Yet these professional understandings
must themselves be explained against the backdrop of Maltese
legal history. In fact the resistance put up by the Maltese legal
profession in the past to legal and judicial interventions by the
British colonial authorities seems to have legitimised separatist and
exclusive ways of conceiving of Maltese law and the lawyer’s
professional role today. The emergence of such conceptions can be
seen as being partly a by-product of the very process of attempting
to describe the Maltese legal system in the context of unequal
discursive exchanges between Maltese legal professionals and
foreign colonial agents.
In this regard it is interesting to take a look at the
proceedings of a British Royal Commission which visited Malta in
1911 (henceforth the “Mowatt Commission”). 62 As part of its remit
covered reforms to Maltese judicial procedure, the Commission,
which was presided over by a British MP and two judges,
interviewed various prominent personalities from the Maltese legal
community, including the Chief Justice, the Crown Advocate
General, the Court Registrar and the President of the Lawyers’
Association. 63 These were questioned exhaustively on a range of
subjects, focusing understandably on procedural issues which
could be causally linked to delays in civil litigation. Most of the
questions dealt with the procedures for opening a court case,
giving testimony, conducting the hearing and appeals. Court
officials were asked to provide statistics on the time which various
proceedings took and on related costs. Yet these inquiries tended to
raise broader issues concerning the nature of the legal system and
key characteristics of Maltese law.
62. Francis R. Mowatt & Mackenzie Chalmers, Report of the Royal
Commission on the Finances, Economic Position and Judicial Procedure of
Malta, in PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (London, 1912).
63. In Malta this is called the “Chamber of Advocates,” originally the
“Camera degli Avvocati.”
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A good example of the way in which procedural questions
tended to evoke more substantive answers occurred when Sir
Mackenzie Chalmers, one of the Commissioners, asked Mr. Leo
Benjacar, the then Registrar of the Maltese Courts about a
particular case—Cini v. Townsley. He immediately launched into
an account of the facts of the case before being pulled up short by
Chalmers, who informed him that: “We are not concerned with the
merits of the claim, but with the length and nature of the
proceedings.” 64 More than a simple mistake, this exchange
suggests a lower sensitivity on the part of the Maltese respondent
to the distinction between procedural and substantive law, which is
prominent in the common law tradition. 65 Other answers are even
more telling. Questioned about the maximum amount of days
before an appeal can be put down for hearing in the list of the
Court of Appeal, Mr Benjacar observed that this would amount to
57 days, but that this period would apply “whether the amount is
only £5 or whether it is £500.” 66 He later attempted to justify the
way court processes did not distinguish cases on the basis of their
value:
I should like to remark that it is not always the
(financial) nature of the case that makes it a big
case; very often it is the nature of the exceptions
(legal pleas). Sometimes a case of a few pounds
becomes an important case because of the nature of
the exceptions. 67
What is being elaborated here is thus a conception of law as an
autonomous field of activity possessing its own internal criteria of
value and which ought not to be assessed in terms of external
monetary criteria. This conception was itself developed in reaction
to the Commissioners’ questions which were premised on the need
to assess the cost and financial importance of cases, reserving full
access to the legal process to those who had the means. Thus, in a
64. Mowatt & Chalmer, supra note 61, at 243.
65. Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil
Law: Legal Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63 (2001).
66. Mowatt & Chalmer, supra note 61, at 235.
67. Id. at 240.
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statement redolent of a Victorian subordination of legal process to
social hierarchy, Commissioner Chalmers suggested removing the
possibility of an appeal in minor cases before the Magistrates’
court:
We hold rather strongly that in these small cases
between small people, where everything is irregular,
the Judge ought rather to act as a judicial arbitrator
and to decide on substantial merits than to work out
points of law. The elaboration of points of law,
where everything is irregular, between small people,
is in fact, an injustice. 68
This picture of Maltese judicial proceedings as obeying an intrinsic
logic which cannot be reduced to the financial interests or social
hierarchies involved, is reinforced by another theme to which the
Commissioners gave a lot of attention, which is the actual temporal
schedule adopted by the courts to structure the hearing of cases.
Since the Mowatt Commission had been instructed to tackle what
the colonial authorities considered to be unacceptable delays in
Maltese court cases, they tried to follow up particular cases to find
out what caused these delays. They were clearly surprised to
discover that the system adopted for the hearing of civil cases
seemed to be based on the assumption that instead of a single
session in which the case would be tried, there would be a series of
hearings, which could reach thirty or forty over a number of years
and which were usually separated from each other by periods of
some three months or so. Each of these hearings was ostensibly
dedicated to tackling a particular aspect of the trial, such as the
examination of a particular witness, or a request for an
interlocutory degree. Often, however, even these issues were not
dealt with due to the failure of one of the witnesses or lawyers to
“appear” in court. In any case the court would then adjourn the
hearing to another date until all the aspects of the case had been
tackled. On any particular day, the judge would have a list of thirty
or forty cases scheduled to be tried in this piecemeal way by him.
Various aspects of this “system” were criticized by the
Commissioners, who observed that: “under that system a case of
68.

Id. at 278.
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any complication may last indefinitely, because every witness
suggests another.” 69 They therefore made many suggestions to
speed up this process, based on the way hearings were structured
before the English courts. Yet most of these suggestions were
rejected by their Maltese interlocutors, who tended to justify
existing delays and to imply that speeding up court processes
would be detrimental to justice. When asked whether Judges could
limit themselves to scheduling four or five cases per day (instead
of thirty or forty) and actually finish them, Mr. Benjacar objected
that “It would come to this: that if one of the lawyers reported
himself ill, the judge would lose a day.” 70 When the
Commissioners repeated this recommendation at a later stage, to
the Advocate General, Dr. Frendo Azzopardi, he observed: “The
question is whether a case can be disposed of in one or two
sittings.” 71 The way in which he justified this reluctance to even
consider changing the system is interesting for at least two reasons.
Firstly, he invoked the functional integrity and specificity of “the
system” to try to blunt the Commission’s unfavourable
comparisons of the Maltese hearings to those held before the
English courts, observing: “When you have a certain system, all
the details of that system work very well and correctly, but when
you have to alter the whole system, it is very difficult.” 72 Secondly,
the above quoted extract implies that trying to speed up the trial
unduly could lead to cases being “disposed of” in a way which is
legally unsatisfactory. As Mr Benjacar claimed, when rejecting the
idea that a case could be adjourned to the next day instead of three
months, “You must give the plaintiff or the defendant, or their
counsel, time to look up books or precedents.” 73
These quoted exchanges barely scratch the surface in terms
of the insights that could be gleaned from a careful reading of the
Mowatt Commission’s proceedings. But the above suffices to
make clear the apparent continuity which exists between colonial

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 241.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 280.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 240.
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and post-colonial reform projects for the Maltese courts 74 and the
discourses of resistance which they provoked. In both cases it is
clear that the specificity of law is insisted upon and any attempt to
reduce delays by changing the procedural rules relating to court
trials is depicted by Maltese legal professionals as simultaneously
threatening their professional identity and the integrity of the legal
system.
IX. CONCLUSION
The implications of this research appear in sharper relief if
it is placed in a comparative perspective. A touchstone is provided
by Sally Merry’s 75 study of the legal consciousness of working
class American clients. She showed how these clients often view
court proceedings as a way to escape the close and constricting
communities in which they are embedded. Litigation offers the
possibility of socially distancing oneself by asserting one’s rights
as a citizen of a bureaucratically organised nation-state. By
comparison, the present study focuses on the other side of the coin,
by showing how lawyers try to socially distance themselves from
their clients and invoke professional ideals for this purpose. Yet
this professional detachment cannot always be maintained. Maltese
lawyers cannot afford to excessively discourage their clients and
must therefore walk the tightrope between patronage and
professionalism. Paradoxically, this may create a situation where
the professional ideals of lawyers are themselves utilised to service
their patronage relationships with their clients; since they allow
lawyers to create delays by “problematising” the compilation of
evidence.
This article aims to demonstrate how particular
understandings of professional detachment represent practically
motivated attempts on the part of advocates to symbolically
separate law from fact and their role in litigation from that of their
74. Indeed, affidavits, pre-trial hearings and the introduction of the office
of the “Master of Rolls” were among the solutions considered by this
commission.
75. SALLY E. MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL
CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (Chicago University
Press, Chicago, 1990).
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clients. It further argues that the association between delay and
professional detachment has a long history in Malta which is
rooted in the relationship of opposition between formal (colonial)
administration and informal (Maltese) law; an opposition which
has been maintained and reproduced for over two hundred years.
This may go some way towards explaining why Maltese law, a
hybrid product that still bears the marks of its colonial origin, is a
difficult and problematic medium of governance. The reasons why
this is so are clearly evidenced by the prophetic words of Sir
Adriano Dingli, drafter of the Maltese Civil Code, with which I
would like to end this article. In 1880, in a letter appended to the
Keenan report, which advocated the compulsory Anglicisation of
the Maltese educational system, Dingli objected to this reform as:
It would be the worst public course, for the
attainment of the desired consummation, to resort to
compulsory measures, in a place like Malta, where
the effects would be disastrous to the immediate
personal interests of the professional classes . . .
perseverance in this might engender an acrimonious
feeling, which the rising generation would share in,
and which might continue long after its origin
would be forgotten. 76

76. GEOFFREY HULL, THE MALTA LANGUAGE QUESTION: A CASE STUDY IN
CULTURAL IMPERIALISM 30 (Said International, Malta, 1993).

